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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CH.A.RLES JOSEPH,
TA~IARA.

LEE tTOSEPH, and
:\of JiJIJA \'"IE JOSEPfi, by Their
Guardian ad litemt

CHARLES

,JQS~JPH,

P laim.tiff s and Appellants,
-

,!

VS~ ~

II~

GR-01lES LAT'l,ER-DAY
SAINTS HOSPITATJ,
rr r,orporation,
Defendarn-t and Respoooent.

W.

Case
No~ 9068

1

BRIEF OF AP·PELLANT·s
~·

··----

Plaintiffs and appellants, Charles Joseph and his two
daughters Melanie .i\.nn and rramara LeeT brought this
action against the defendant to reeover damages for the
wrongful death of Lucille ,Joseph~ tlleir wife and mother.
Lucille ~Joseph entered the T;+ D. 84 Hospital in Salt
Lake City, litah~ on Apri1 4, 1953, for an ovarian cyst
operation. During that O{Jetation she was given a trans~
fusion of one pint of blood. Following the opera~ ion and

1
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after her return to l1er room, she \VU s given another pint
of blood. Soon after the transfusion of the second pint of
blood was started, \f rs .•J oscph started s'veating and
chilling. The next mor11 ing a. urine Ram pie '\Vas taken
from Mrs. Jo~cph that "\Vas a dark reddish brown color.
()u .A.pril 14, 1953, ten days after the operation~ JVIrs~
.Joseph died of a lo\ver nephron nephrosis whlclt is a:n
infla.mma t.j on of tb e kidney that pre ven t.s it from excret~
ing the urine. rrhe lo,ver nephron nephrosi~ \Vas caused
by a hemolytic blood transfusion reaction.

It is undisputed that the lo\ver nephron nephrosis was
ea.used by an incompatible blood transfusion reaction.
Plaintiffs claim the hospital was negligent in administering incompatible b]ood to the de(~edent or in failing
to stop the transfusion after an unfavorable reaction ~:ras
noticed or should have been no tiecd. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on the sole issue of whether
or not the hospital vras negligent i11 failing to stop the
transfusion aft cr an unfavorable reaction was noticed.
The trial court refused to submit the ease to the jnry on
the question of ''Thethcr the hospital was negligent in
administering incompatible blood. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant, no cause of action~ and
from the judgment entered thereon this appeal is taken.
STATE~fENT

OF POIX1,S

PoiYT

I

THE TRIA.T~ COURT ERR.ED IX REFUSING TO
Sl}B1£IT THE CASE ':rO THE JURY ON THE
rrHEORY OF R-ES IPSA LOQUITUR.
2
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PoiNT

II

PROVING A SPECIFIC ACT OF NEGLIGENCE
DO~~S

~<)rr

PREVJ£NT APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF RFJS IPSA LOQUITUR.
ARGL-.-1\lEXT
PotNT

THE TRIAL COUR'_r

ERR~lD f)J

SUBMIT THE CASE TO
•rHEORY OF RES

IPS~;\

I

R.EFTJS lXCr-

THE JURY

rro

ON THE

IDQUTTUR.

The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the
hospital has operated a blood bank since the year 1942·.
When a donor goes to the hospital to donate blood, a reg~
istered ·nurse prepares the donor so that the blood can
be taken~ The blood is taken directly from the donor's
body into a pint bottle~ After the pint bottle is full, blood
is placed in three small pilot tubes. One of the pilot tubes
is attached by means of masking tape to the pint bottle.
The pint bottle of blood together with the attached pilot
tube is then placed in the blood bank refrigerator Vt'here
it is kept until it is needed for a transfusion. rrhe otller
t'vo pilot tubes are used by the blood bank technicians for
the pnrpose of chec.king the blood to see if it is proper to
be used for t-ransfusions a1:1d 1s used for the p11rposP of
typing it as to whether it iH t.ype A., type B, type AB or
type 0~ A further test is run to deter1ninc '~{l1ether the
blood is Rh positive or Rh negative. (R.27~~279)
The nurse who takes the blood from the donor and
the technicians that check the blood and type it are em3
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ployees of the hospitaL The nurse or technician who
p 1aces t.he blood in the refrigerator is an employee of the
hospitaL rr11e blood ba11k is rrm and operated by the
hospital.
\Vhen a patient requires a transfusion, a sample of
that patient's blood is taken to t.he blood hank where a
technician runs tests to determine vthether tl1 c patient's
hlood is type A, type B, tJ·pe AB or type 0 and whetbcr
it i~ 1-l.ll negative or Rh positive. In the ease before this
court a sample of fifrs. Joseph's blood was taken all(l it
V{as determined that she had tyr)e A Rh positive blood.
Tl1e hospital then took tv{o pints of blood from the blood
bank that had previously been determined to be type A
RH positive blood. The pilot tube~ that Vlerr. attached
to the two pints of blood by maski11g tape were removed
h~y· a technielan and t.h(j blood eontained in those pilot
tubes was matched and cross matehed with the sample of
blood that llad boen taken from Airs. Joseph. It sho1dd
be not~d th.a.t the actual blood in the pint bottles ~vhich
blood is the blood thrJJt was la=ter transfusf'd into the body
of .I.lfrs. Joseph uJa.8 not itself 'fYW.tched or cross tnatched
-with the sample of ![ rs4 Joseph ~s blood. It was only the
blood from the pilot tu.bes that was 1natched an.d cross
m.atched with Jlf rs4 Joseph's blood4 (R276, 277)
'The methods of matehing and cross matehing of the

blood used by the hospital 'vere (l} saline method on the
slide and ( 2) saline method i u the test tube and ( 3) the
high protein meth:Od of testing4 Those methods were used

for testing in 1953 and are the same tests that are being
4
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set up in the standards for blood transfusion in the man~
ual for 1958 by the Association of Blood Banks and Blood
Banks Council (R268)
After it vras suspected that :&.Irs~ Joseph ~,..as suffering from a transfusion reaction, 4:he original specimen of
her blood vras still ava.ila ble~ That specimen of blood 'Vas
again checked as to type and it. \vas again matched and
cross matched vrith the pilot tubes from the donor bottles~
In addition to this test an Indirect Coombs test 'vas r11n.
1~his t(~~l. \vas not routinely rnn at that time. That teRt vras
one \\·here the patient's serum is tested 'vith the eell~ of
tlu~ donor blood and t.his test showed the donor blood
was compatible \v ith the blood of I\f rs.. Joseph. ~1rR.
Lamont testified that this \Vould test for any type of incompatibility that could be poRsibly tested for~ (R265)
TJ1c Indirect Coombs test would detect or would eliminate
any cha.nec or ineompatibility as far as antibodic~ eou1d
be tested for. (1!270-271) Dr. Crockett, an interniRt 7 testified ~ hnt the purpose
mat.ehi ng and eross matching iR

or

to eliminate as far as possible the occurrenee of tranR-

fusion reactions. (RlG2) Dr. 'Vi11trobe, a world-famous
blood specialist, testified that if the typi1tg, matching and
rrnss matching of thr:. patient's blood vtith that of

tlH~

donor's blood is properly done that a patient orrlina r1ly
will not suffer from a hemolytic transfusion

rea(~tion~

( R18H) It \vould be unusual to ha. ve a fa tal trans fusion

reaction after those trsts were

rnn~

( 1~188) Dr.

Carlqui-st~

patl1ologist and employee of the defendant hospii.slr tes-

tified as follo,vs:
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Q.

Uan tests be made before the blood is adminis~

tcred to eliminate llemolysis!
A.

Yes. Typing and eross matching tests are run
for that purpose~

Q. .A.nd if that is properly done, you do not get
.any hemolysis4 Is tbat right Y
A. We should not expect hemolysis.
Q4

And that was true of the tests that you were
running in 1953; if you run tests properlyt
matched and cross matched the blood before it
was administered, you 'vouldn 1t get any
hemolysis1

.A.. We would no-t expect it. There may be a rare
instance in which it might occur, but we would
not expect it by the tests that we ran. {R289)
At pagG 292 of the record Drr Carlqnist testified that
"\Vhen he testiiied at tl1e first trial of the case he testified
that if the blood was properly matched and cross matc-hed
that you "\VO u]d 11ot get any hemolysis at all. He then
said in vlew of later knowledge he is now modifying that
testimony to say that you might get hemolysis in a rare
case even though there is proper matching and cross
matching. It should be noted that Dr4 Carlquist at the
time of the second trial did not express an opinion at all
and v_ras not ~ked for an opinion as to whether or not
Mrs. Joseph died as a result of transfusion reaction.

The evidence in this case shQws without contradiction,
and the trial court so found as a matter of law,. that Mrs.
J.oseph died from a lo\ver nephron nephrosis which was
produced by an inc-ompatible blood transfussion reaction.
6
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(R125, 164, 177) The evidence shows without dispute
that it is ~1 n rare'~ or "unusual'' occurrence for a per·
son to ha Ye a fa tal hemolytic transfusion reaction if the
blood is properly typed, matched and croHs matched~
Stated differently, in the ordinary course of events a fat.a1
transfusion reaction will not occur unless there has been
improper ty·-ping~ matching or ('fOSs matching.. (1{116~
lG:J~ 160)
It \vas the posit.ion of p1aintiffs at the first trial and
at the gecond trial that the hospital was negligent in the
typing, matching, cross matching or in the giving of an
incompatible blood to Mrs. Joseph. The case v.ras suhrnitted to the jur·y on t.hat theory at the first trial. At
the second trial the court refused to submit that issue to
the jury. It is plaintiffs' position t.hat. the do(~t.rine of
re~') ipsa loquitu-r should apply and the question of
whether or not the hospital was negligent in the typing,
matching, cross matching or in the giving of incompatible
blood to Mrs. Joseph should have been submitted to the
jury.. In determining "\vhethcr or not 'res ipsa loqn·itur
applies~ this court in a number of cases and in partic.ular
in the case of Moore v. Ja-mP.:s 1 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P. 2d 221,
laid down the f ollo\ving test and said the doctrine does
apply when ( 1) the accident \Vfl~ of a kind "\vhieh, in tll e
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had
the def cndant 11serl. due care, ( 2) the instrument or thing
causing the injury was at the time of the acr.id ent under
the management and control .of the defendant, and (3)
the accident happened irrespective of any participation

at the time by the plaintiff.
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rrhere isn't any question in this case but what the
blood v.r;hich caused the injury was under the management
.and coJlLrol of the defendant. There is also no question
hut what the injury to the decedent happened without
any fault on t.he part of tl1c decedent and "'-'ithout any
fau1t on the part of the plaintiffs.. The doctors in this
ease have tef;tified that a fatal hemolytic. transfusion
l'Ca(·tion ordinarily does not occur unless there l1as been
improper typing, matehing or cross matching of the
blood. -v~le think the doctrine does apply and tl1at the
court erred in not so instrueting tile jury.

It may be argued by the defendant that sinc.e the
doetors stated tl1at in a rare case you might get a hemolytic. transfusion reaetion eve11 tLough there had been
proper typing~ matching and cross matching of the blood,
that the doctrine of res ·ipp.a, loquilu.-r doeH 11ot apply. It

should be noted that using the language of this court in
t.he Moore c.ase, .supra~ the rule was not stated that in
order to apply res ipsa. lo quit-u.r the accident had to be of
a kiBd \vhich <~ould not. under any (·ircumstane<~8 have
occurred unless the defendant failed to usc due eare, but
on the contrary the rnle '\\Tas stated ''it does apply "\vl1en
the accident "\Vas of a kind w hic.l1, ·in the o rrlinary course
of cren.t8, U)01.1.lrl -not half)f': happened had the dcfe-nda-n.t
1.1..sr.d d'u.,e care.'' The doctors ·in this case did testify th-at
absent i-mproper typing, tna.tchin:q ot cross 1n.-a.trhmg you
ordi·n.a·rily u:(~uf.rl no f. get a fatal tra12..r;;{n.~iott reaction. Th~
doctors did sa;y that i1~ a rare case you might get such a
4

_fatal reaction eve11- tho-ugh there -tt'a-s proper matching,

t/1 pi-n..(! and cross ma.tc hing.
8
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If it is necessary in order to invoke the doctrine of
;·es ipsa loquitur~ to show that the accident is of sueh a
kind that it absolutely can never happen unless the defendant did not use due c.are, then '\o\'C have failed to make
a sho,ving under the evidcnec of t.his case that 'vould require submitting the case to the jury on the theory of
res ipsa loquit·u.r. On the other hand if the rule is as
~tn t.(.Ld i.n the lioore case that it Vlill apply if the accident
is of a kind which in. the ordinmry co1.1.rse of erP·nts 1J)otrld.
not hare happened ha-d the defe~Jtdwrd u..sed due care, then
we have shown that a fatal transfusion reaction ordinarily does not oceur Vlithout negligence on the part of
the defendantt and we submit that the trial court should
have let tho case go to t.he jury on the theory of res ipsa
loquitur.
In the case before this court it should be kept in
mind that aU of the blood for testing 'vas ill the hands of
the defenda.pt. All of the available mca11s for dctermi11i ng
'vhether or not the blood used in the transfusion ~~as
incompatible was in the hands and under the eontrol of
the defendant.. It should further be remembered tl1a t. t l1 e
actual blood tl1at 'va~ transfused into \:IT~. Joseph vtas
not matched or r.ross matched v..ith ~lrs . Joscpl1 ,s blood.
The blood from the pilot tubes t.l1 at \Vere attached t.o the
bottles containing the blood that was actually used in

the tranf.;fusion was vthat ·was used for the matching and
cross matching. Had the court permitted tl~e case to go
to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquit·ur it would
have been a proper inference for the jury to have dra\\~H

that the pilot tube attached to one or both of the bottles
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of blood used in the transfusion was different type of
blood, or to state it differently that the pilot tubes could
have gotten mixed np and that the blood in the pilot tubes
1\Tas of a different type than the blood in the bottles eontaining the b1ood that was actually used in the transfusion.
It is quite obvious that if a pilot tube containing one
type of blood was erroneously attached to a bottle con~
taining another type of blood that the niatching and cross
matc.hing tests might very well show that the blood in t.he
pilot tube was compatible vr.ith that of a patient's blood,
but it certainly would not show compatibi1ity between the
blood in the bottle used in the transfusion and the
blood of the patient.

It is impossible in this case for the plaintiffs to
kltO'\V or to find out V\~ hat actually occurred. The defendant put on considerable evidenc-e to show that it used
due care in the matching, cross matching and typing of
the blood in question. Since the blood that caused the
transfusion reaction was in the exclusive control of the
defendant and since the plaintiffs' conduct could not have
had anything to do with the transfusion reaction and
since a fatal transfusion reactiott does not ordinarily
happen but is a rare thing absent carelessess on the part
of the defendant, we submit that the plaintiffs should
have been permitted to go to the jury on the theory of
res ips(lJ l oquitu.r.

In Sherman v . Ha.rtutoot 137 Cal. App. 2d 589,. 290 P.
2d 894, the plaintiff while under nn anesthetic was given
a blood transfusion. The needle came out of the vein and

10
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permitted blood to get into the soft tissue of plaintiffts
arm thereby causing damage.
The evidence showed that it is a common occurrence
for needles to come out of patient's veins when they
are receiving a transfusi011. The evidence 'vas also to
the effect that it was unusual, ho\vever, for blood to get
into the soft tissues from a. needle that comes out of the
vein in sufficient quantities to cause any damager
The court took the position that as against the de~
f endan t, hospital, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
The c.ourt said,

''The hospital takes the position that because
it is quite common occurrence for transfusion
needles to come out of the veins, res ipsa toquitwr
cannot a.pply here. Such contention overlooks the
evidence that such a common occurrence does not
result in the condition of plaintiff's arm.. It is that
unusual result 'that causes the doctrine t.o apply
and to require explanation, an explanation 'vhiclt
does not appear in the case. At least, these matters were for the determination of the jury. It
cannot be said as a matter of la"\\'" that there was no
evidence of negligence.''
The Supreme Court of California jn the case of
Bischoff v. Neu~by's Tire Service, 333 P . 2d 44, illustrates
the rule that if the accident is of the type that does not
in the ordinary course of events occur unless the defendant was negligent, the doctrine of res ipsa [.() quitur
applies. It further illustrates that it is not necessary to
show that the accident is of such a nature that it never
happens or that it is impossible to happen unless the
11
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defendant was uegligent-~ In this case the plaintiff was
standing approxi1nately ten feet from defendant whlle
defendant \vas fixing a tire that. he had removed from
plaintiff's automobile. rl1llc head of tln~ l1am.mer that
defendant was using on the tire flew off, hit plaintiff in
the faec aud caused him substantial injur_y.

In this ea.so the defendant testified that althougl1 it
i~ ItOt unusual for llammcr heads to looHen, usually a per-

son eait tell by the feel of" the ]Jammer during its use that
it iR loosening. The defendant also le~tified tl1at it was
almost impossible for a ti gl1t head to fly off, but admitted
tlntt it could happen. The court then observes,
"The conclusion could be drawn from Lo"\very ~s testimony that he did not ferl the head
1oo s ening, that this \Vas a very peculiar hammer
\:rlri<~-11 loosened and ±1 e1v up art v--ithin the space of
a single stroke~ Ilo"\'i.'ever, the in fcrencc that he
was not paying close enough attention to his
\\rork seems the more probable one. From the
evidence a jury reasonably could infer that an
accident sueh as here took plac.c probably would
r1ot have oecurred in the ahsence of negligenee .
'V e ~onclu dr i i vraR a case appropriate for the
giving of an instruction on res ipsa loquitur/'
Cnder tlH~ evidenee in thi~ case it \\ras shov,.11 that
the head of a hammer in the ordinary course of events
does not come off un 1ess 1t ha ~ bePn loosened to a point
~'"here the person using the hammer should be able to tell
it is loo~P. Or 8tnted differeHtly, it is unlikely that the
head of a hammer would come off in one stroke without
being loose CllOllgh so that the person using it \vonld
have observed it. The evidence indic-ates that that could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hH PIH~n bnt it is unlikely~ In the Bischoff case the defend-

ant testi Iicd that the hammer head ~~as not looRe and if it
had of been he V{ould have noticed it and 'vould have
fixed it. The defendant 's evidence t.ended to negative
completely any negligence on the part of the defendant.
It also tended to sho\v that the head of the ha.mnlCl'
could fly off without becoming loose ar1d gi"'ring a warning
to the person using it but that it "\vas ext.remely unlikely.
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur a.pplied and that the jury could consider the
iui'erence of negligence from the application of the rule
as against the testimony of t 1~ e defendant and that the rule
would support a finding of negligence even in the face of
defendant,"' e·vidence of due care.

In the case before this court the evidenee is to the
effect that in the ordinary course of events a person 'viii
not suffer from hemolytic LransfusioJl reaction 11nles8
someone has been negligent in the matching, cross matching or typing of the blood. It could possibly happetl even
though due care Vlas used in tbe matching and cross
matching and typing of the blood, although it "\VOuld be
rare. It is also possible the head of a hammer could
loosen in one stroke and eomc off without "rarning~ The
California Court in this case demonstrates tl1at it. is not
nec.essary to invoke the doctrine to show the accident is
one that eannot possibly happen absent. due care hut only

that ordinarily does not happen absent due eare. The
hospital offered evidenc.c that tended

to

~how

due care on

its part. We think the JUry was entit1ed to weigh the
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inference of negligence aristng from the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur as against the evidence of the
defendant of due care4
In Bmwris v. Haas, 45 CaL 2d 811,. 291 P. 2d 915,
plaintiff en t.orcd the hospital as a routine obstetrical cas e.
The defendant, Dr . West, administered the spinal anesthetic.. After the birth of the baby the plaintiff 'vas partially paralyzed. Plaintiff brought this action against
Dr. West for negligently administering the spinal anesthetic and against Dr. llaas, the obstetrician, on the
notion t-hat he knowingly permitted West to negligently
administer the anesthetic a.nd against the hospital on the
th~ory that it was liable as an employer of Dr . West
The trial court granted a motion for a nonsuit and
held that the doctrine of res ipsa l.fJ quitur did not apply.
1,11e Supreme Court reversed and held that it did apply.
The plaintiff claimed the paralysis was due to damage
to the spinal cord that was caused when Dr. West inserted
the needle above the 12th thoracic vertebra. There was
medic-al testimony tlla t oroinari Iy '~·here due care is used
in achninis tering a spinal anesthetic that perma.nen t pa-

ralysis 'vill not oc.cur. rrhere was also medical testimony
to the effect that paraly8is may result from a number of
causeR other than negligence in giving a spinal anest.h etic
in that. a certain pereentage of eases paralysis "Will result

f1·om spinal .anesthesia without any negligence.. The
Supreme Court reviewed a11 of the evidence and held
that res ipsa loq-uit-ur would app 1y. In so holding the

eon rt said,
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"We said in Zentz v. Coea-Cola Bottling Co.,
39 Cat 2d 436, 442-, 24·7 P. 2d 344, 347, so far as
the first requirement is concerned~ that the accident, or injury, must be of a kind which ~:' ordinarily" or -'fprobab1y" does not happen in the
absence of negligence and that ~:'In the l.;a Porte
( '-~. I-Iouston) ease~ 33 Cal. 2d (167), at page 169,
199 P . 2d ( 665) at page 6~6, lNe said, after assuming that defendants were in control at the time of
the accident, that 'the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur depends on v.rhcthcr it
can be said, in the light of common experience,
that the acc.ident \'.ras more likely than not the
result of t}uji r." (defendants') negligence. {Citations.) '{Where no such balance of probabilities in
favor of ncgligcllt-e can be found, t>PS ipsf1 loq·uit-ur
does not apply.,, ' In determining •tVbcthcr sueh a
probability exists 'vi th regard to a particular
occurrence, the courts have relied both upon com~
mon kno,vledge a.n_d the testimony of expert ,vit.nesses.. Seet for example:t Cavero v. Franklin
General Benev. Soc., 3G CaL ~d 301, 309, 223 P. 2d
471; Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Cor, 24 Cal. 2d
453, 459, 46Q, 150 P . 2d 436; Juehert v4 California
\Vater Service Co., 16 CaL 2<1 500, 515, 106 P. 2d
886; Judson v~ Giant Powder (~o., 10"7 CaL 549,
561, 40 P. 1020, 29 L . R.A. 718 ( 48 Am.. St.
Rep. 146)r"

We also said in Zentz vs. Coea-Cola Bottling
Co., supra, 39 CaL 2d 436, 445, 247 P~ 2d 344, 348,
that'' .A..nother factor which some of the eases have
considered in applying the doctrine is that the defendant may have superior knowledge of what
occurred and that the chief evidence of the cause
of the accident may be aceessible to the defendant
hut inacc-essible to the plaintiff.''
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lu .lfilias Y. Jl7 heele.-r H osp·ital 7 109 Cal Aylp. 2d 759 7
241 P. 2-d 684 ~ the plain l iff1 a small gi r I, "\\,.a~ taken to the
hospital in a d-esperately ill eondition suffering from
osteomyelitis~ rrhe doctor preseribed that ~·arm comprrs~es be applied to the calf of plaintiff ~s leg \vhich \\~ a.s
done by the nurses. The nurses testified that. tl1e compl'Gsses applied with a heating pad did not appear to
have e(1used the burns. The burns on the leg rcsufted
lll scarnng
•

I

r

~rhc

trial court held that the doctrine of 1~e.s ipr.Ja
loqu·il-ur did apply. On appeal the appellate eourt
affirmed~

Several doetors testified in the case that scarring
such as occurred here vraA a normal and natural result of
the ne(~e~.<~a.ty treatn1e1lt for tbe <~-ondition or of the osteo~
myelitis and blood poiS:Oning or that plaintiff's condition
vr"as sueh she 'vas unalJlD to stand the ""'arrnth nce.essary
to save her life.
In thi~ casP \re have the situation ~There there was
Ruhst.antial evidence that the searring eould haYe resulted
from the burn~ or tbal it could have resulted because of
tlu: plainLiff'~ condition which made her unable to v.:itll-

stand the "\va.rmth that

1~tas

neressary to save her life.

Stated another way fhc jury could have found that the
l·H~arring

could have resulted from burns that \'\Tere pro-

duced by t~xrr~sive heat, or tbe jury (•ould haYe found

that the searring oceurred vrithout negligence bec.allSe it
o,vas a normal anrl natural result of the necessary trl\utSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment, or of the osteomyelitis a.nd blood poisoning, or
that her condition wa~ such that she \Vf1~ unable to stand
the warmtl1 necessary to save her life. '"rhe court held it
was for the jury to determine whether plaintiff's condition resulted from negligenc.e of the defendant or whether
it resulted 'vithout negligence on tJ1c part of the defendant.
This case ~bows the application of the rule that the
doctrine of res ipsa loqu.itur applies if the accident was of
a kind \vhich ordinarily docs not occur in the absence of
someone 's ncgligenc.e. It clearly illustrates tl1at 1t. is not
necessary to show that the ac,r.ident [sofa kind that never
happens "\vithout negligence.
The following iR a quote from an article entitled Medical Legal Responsibility of the 1\:Iedical Teehnologist. that
appears in Volume 20 of the A.mericait Jouma1 of 1VTedical
Technology . This article 'vas present.cd in 1VT ay of ] 953.

"The slightest ina ttentiOll on the part of t.l1 e
technician can result in serums becomi11g iT1terchanged, in bottles of blood becoming interchanged, in names becoming mixed up, in t.ho
wrong pilot tube being att.aehed to a bottle of
blood, in a failure to properly read a label or
properly prepare a label. TI1csc are jlH~L f:l. few of
the things that could happen anrl for whieh the
tec.hnieian and his employer would be liable~''
The medical profession itself recognizes that the
transfusion of an ineompatible blood is in and of itself
evidence of negligence. In an article published April 18,
1953, in Volume 151 of t.he ,Journal of the American ~fed ical Association the committee on }!edicolcgal

17
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of the American Medieal Association had the following
to say,
a~ a result of a transfusion
blood of an in(~rrect group~ or suffers a pro~

"If a patient dies

of
longed illness due t.o injury to his kidneys,. the
pateitn'.s family or the patient himself, if he survives~ may be entitled to damages rmless thcte
were extenuating circumstances calling for rapid
action~ II ere the doctrine res ipsa loquit'Uii may be
applicable, becausD t-ransfusion of an incompatible
group at the present stage of knowledge may be
considered prima facie evidence of negligence. ' '

It sh011ld be remembered the article mentioned above
\\"aH pub1ished two 1\,..eeks after l\1.ts~ Joseph eutered the
hospital.
a collcetion of utah cases involving the res ipsa
lo q1.l-ifu-r doctrine in -c· t ah see 3 I-; tab Tj aw Review 113.
Ca.ses j nvolvi ng 1iability for injury or death from blood
transfusion are annotated in 59 ALR 2d 770. There arc
no blood transfusion cases involving the question of the
applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur tl1at \VC
have been able to find other than the ones we have cited~
~.,or

As we stated earlier in this brief, if it. is necessary
to sho"\\r that the do at h of 1\.frs. J Dseph was an accident
that roo1d not possibly happen without someone being
ncgl igcnt i u ordPr to in voko the doctrine of 1'fS ipsa
lo qql.itu.r, then our e \~i (_1 enee is not suffie.iont and the doctrine does not apply. However, if the rule laid down in
Moore vL Jantes, supra~ means \\~hat it says, v... .e have shoV~-~
definitely that the death of 1\lrs . Joseph wa.s a result of an
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occurrence that does not ordinarily ta.ke place unless
someone 'vas negligent.. 'Ve have sho~·n that a hemolytic
transfusion reaction severe enough to cause death is very
unlikely and i8 a rare occurrence unless someone has
been negligent.. \Ve believe the doctrine does apply aJld
that the trial court 'vas in error in refusing to so inst.ruct
the jury~ The case should be reversed and a new trial
granted.
PoiNT

II

PROVING A SPECIFIC ACT OF NEGLIGENCE
DOES XOT PREVENT APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF RES IPS~~ LOQUITUR~
The trjal court refused to instruct on res ipsa loquit-u-r
for three reasons.. (1) The main reason \vas the eourt
felt this was not a proper ease to invoke the doetrine,
(2) res ip.~a loquitur was not pleaded, and ( 2) a Rpecific
act of negligence wa.s proved. ( R.299-301)
Our Supreme Court in the case of An,_qerm-O.'Il- Com-~
pa·ny v~ Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 290 P~ 169, held that. plaintiff is not prevented from invoking the doctrine of res
ipsa loq-uit·ur merely because he also pleads some spGcific
acts of negligence.. The case of Sher1na1Yb v~ H a.rtm-M~~
supra, also holds that under~ general allegation of negligence the doetrine of res ipsa loq·uitur does app1y . Res
ipsa loqui-tu-r can be relied upon under a general allegation
of negligence. See also Deardon v. San Pedro, L. A. to
S~

[.;. Co., 33 Utah

147~

93 P. 271.

Irul.f oo·re v . •1 ames, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P. 2d 221~ t.he
plaintiff in addition to resting the ease on the theory of
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-res ipsa loquit-ur also proved a specific act of negligence
by calling a ma.id as a witness to testify that she had
pushed another leg out of its groove once or twice on the
same bathtub whe11 cleaning under the tub with a mop~
stick and had pushed it back with her hand, and then had
reported it to the defendant, \\'ho promised to fix it. The
defendant denied the testimony of the maid and also put
in evidence of the inspection that \\' ag made l)y the defendant as to the condition of the legs on the bathtub. "rhe
court in that ease lteld that it was error for the trial court
to refuse to submit the case to the jury on the theory of
res ips a loquitur. rr11e court a 1so held that even though
the plaintiff proved a specific act of negligence (namely
the testimony of tlu~ maid as to the loose leg on t.he tub)
that res ipsa loquitur was applicable and even though the
jury disbelieved the maid's testimony the court held the
case should go to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur and from t.hat. the jury could make a :finding of
negligenc~ that would support a judgment in fav~r of
the plaintiff.
Respectfully sn bmit ted,
~:foBROO~I

& HANNI"
Attorneys for Plaimiffs
rond Appellants
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